In this article, I address a controversy about species meanings and a racialising discourse of animality surrounding the Homo naledi fossils that were discovered in 2013 at the Cradle of Humankind; a fossil-rich area located just outside of Johannesburg. Nothing less than the origins, and definition, of humanity were said to be at stake in the fossils. This claim issued from the co-presence within the specimens of so-called "human" and "animal" features. In South Africa, the fossils provoked what Claire Jean Kim (2015) would call an 'impassioned dispute' about the perceived relationships between animals -particularly primates -and persons who are socially marked, and who identify, as black. Situating the naledi event within the long history of the 'interconstitution' (Kim 2015) of blackness and animality, I argue that the controversy surfaced anxieties about the untethering of racialising species meanings from prevailing ideas about the ontological foundations of "the human". By approaching the cultural politics of the dispute, I explore how it provided an opening onto the conjugation of race and species within South Africa and conclude that the naledi event attests to the perils of eliding the history of race science as well as the difficulty of retaining within anti-racist politics "the animal" as a device to secure "the human".
Museum in London, said that 'the more we find out the less we know' adding that Homo sapiens's 'lineage' is both 'widening' and 'evolving'. 14 In a similar vein, Jessica Thompson, a palaeolithic archeologist, has argued that the evolutionary process 'doesn't start out with something that looks like a monkey, and the (sic) something that looks like an ape, and then something that looks like a human, and then all of a sudden you've got people … It's much more complicated than that ' (in Sample 2017:[sp] ). Berger's assessment of naledi's importance also proposes an intensely ramified conception of sapiens's formation. National Geographic reported on Berger's views about this subject in the following terms:
He doesn't claim he has found the earliest Homo, or that his fossils return the title of "Cradle of Humankind" from East to South Africa. The fossils do suggest, however, that both regions, and everywhere in between, may harbor clues to a story that is more complicated than the metaphor "human family tree" would suggest … Berger himself thinks the right metaphor for human evolution, instead of a tree branching from a single root, is a braided stream: a river that divides into channels, only to merge again downstream (Shreeve 2015:56) .
Another feature of the naledi materials that supports this re-evaluation of received models of human evolution is that they index a species which evidenced a perplexing amalgamation of anatomically modern "human" and 'primitive' -or "animal" -features some of which, the shoulders included, have been described as 'apish' (Shreeve 2015:43) . To date, the initial claims about this 'schizoid' (Shreeve 2015:43) anatomy have been corroborated by later research, which indicates that, although 'naledi only had a brain the size of an orange', the hominin was nonetheless capable of performing 'a number of human-like behaviours' (Smillie 2018:[sp] ]. Naledi's distinctive co-mixture of properties that are taken to be either human or animalic makes for a species that Berger et al. construe as almost, but not quite, "human". All of this being said, I am not concerned here with excavating the implications for palaeoscience of the aforementioned details. 15 I attend to a different, albeit related, controversy.
In South Africa, the fossils provoked what Claire Jean Kim (2015) would call an 'impassioned dispute' about the perceived relationships between animals, particularly primates, and persons who are socially marked, and who identify, as black. The naledi specimens appear to underscore just how thoroughly connected are species that have been held in quarantine from one another within western ontological imaginaries about "human"-"animal" distinctions. Depending on which study one consults, chimpanzees are said to share between ninety six and ninety nine percent of their DNA with humans. 16
This is not to say that different humans do not have genetic profiles that are even more humans have produced classificatory systems that have 'read momentous political and moral meaning into these differences' by putting 'humans and chimpanzees into discontinuous, unequal categories of beings' (Kim 2015:16) . To put it differently, the taxonomical separation of the "human", particularly the "white human", from the "nonhuman", or "animal", is a naturalised product of a complex western history through which species differences have been racialised and race has been animalised (See Haraway 1991; Haraway & Wolfe 2016; Wolfe 2010; Chen 2012; Jackson 2013; Deckha 2012 , Kim 2010 Kim & Freccero 2013; Lundblad 2013; de Robillard & Lipschitz 2017) . Race, as Kim notes, 'has been articulated in part as a metric of animality, as a classification system that orders human bodies according to how animal they are -and how human they are not with all the entailments that follow (Kim 2015:18, emphasis in original) . According to Kim (2015) , these taxonomical practices are 'synergistic'; and, they build taxonomical borders that have been made to produce and anchor racialised/ing species hierarchies. Developments in the overlapping fields of critical animal studies and critical posthumanism have convincingly demonstrated that all of this matters because 'discourses and technologies of biopower hinge on the species divide' (Chen 2012:6) . 18
In South Africa's violent history of nation-making the very matter and meaning of "the human", what Haraway (2010 Haraway ( & 2016 would call its material-semiotic substance, has always been said to be at stake at the Cradle. As its name makes explicit, the Cradle has been rendered as a place in which humans were conceived and nurtured. 19 Within this history, the naledi project is an up-to-date example of the production of humanness (Chen 2012) . In westo-centric contexts, projects of this sort are typically organised under the aegis of humanism and, as Rosi Braidotti (2013) , among others, has shown, humanism has been a race-making endeavour. 20 Predictably, the initial publicity about the fossils neglected to mention that, for part of the twentieth century, the much vaunted Cradle was a laboratory for race science. It should go without saying that race science is a thoroughly ignominious and discredited pursuit. 21 As Bonner et al.
(2007) document, the Cradle was a site where ideas about white superiority were manufactured through racialising taxonomical practices that took the form of 'comparative anatomy' (Dubow 2007:14 has also functioned as a race-making institution. The 'special issue' of the magazine on the topic of race published in April 2018 substantiates this claim. In the aforementioned issue, with the assistance of John Edwin Mason, a historian of both photography and Africa, National Geographic performed a remarkable mea culpa by drawing attention to how it had invited its readers to enter into an unremittingly racist visual regime for most of the 130 years it has been in circulation. 22 Catherine Lutz and Jane Collins (1991) had previously illustrated the racialising effects of the magazine's visualising procedures, which is to say that they had demonstrated why National Geographiclike the Cradle -has a history of functioning as a race-making apparatus. Now, while the Homo naledi media briefing did not draw attention to these histories, they nonetheless account for the controversy about how the fossils should be interpreted.
As I will show, the controversy surfaced anxieties about the untethering of racialising species meanings from prevailing ideas about the ontological foundations of "the human" (Lipschitz 2014; De Robillard & Lipschitz 2017; Jackson 2013; Kim 2010 Kim , 2015 Kim , 2016 . For this reason, the naledi event was a noteworthy moment within the production of the post/apartheid racial imagination. By approaching the cultural politics of the dispute, I explore how it provided an opening onto the conjugation of race, species meanings, and the racialised discourse of animality within South Africa. In this respect, this paper contributes towards recent scholarship within the enmeshed habitats of critical posthumanism and critical animal studies that takes seriously the salience of species and animality for the making of race. 24 In addition, it extends an argument presented with Ruth Lipschitz (2017) in which we establish why it is vital for anti-racist politics to unmake, rather than reproduce, "the animal". Doing this is a prerequisite if we are to 'meaningfully and radically rethink the category of the human' (Kim 2015:286 Claas Blank 27 and Rijkhaert Jacobsz, 28 each serving prison sentences on Robben Island, were judged, by the colonial administration, to have 'mutually perpetrated'
"sodomy" 29 and in doing so the film evinces how colonial logics criminalised 'anal or intercrural intercourse' (Stobie 2016:917) . After being found "guilty" of this "crime" the men were sentenced to death by drowning in In this scene, Proteus is, of course, staging the production of humanness. A racemaking process that was, and is, predicated on the construction of "the animal", from whom the human is both distinguished and separated through various mediating figures, including the ostensible "Hottentot". The spectator is aligned with Blank's and
Niven's perspectives as they look at the illustrations in the Systema naturae and observe that the taxonomical distinctions Niven enumerates are those that Linnaeus had constructed between the so-called "white" European, who was imbued with virtues, and "other" -lesser -types of "human". Through Niven's reference to the 'monorchides Hottentoti tail', what this scene suggests, but cannot fully convey, is how whiteness was invented through an array of technologies including the fallacious orientation of Linnaeus's observations in this regard. The botanist's formulations of race and species were not singular, '[m]any European scientific observers from the 1600s forward posited that the so-called Hottentots (KhoiKhoi of South Africa) were the connecting link between man and ape' (Kim 2015:36) . Kim (2010:62-63, emphasis in original) encapsulates the long and coiled histories of the idea that humans are "human" because they are not "animals":
Aristotle's notions of natural hierarchy and natural slavery, the Christian belief that man was made in the image of God and granted "dominion" over all living creatures, the medieval notion of the Great Chain of Being, Cartesian ideas about mind and matter, and Kantian arguments about autonomy and relationality have all done their part over centuries, in entrenching notions of human supremacy. Humans and animals, we learn, belong to distinct, heriarchically ordered categories of beings … In thinking this way, we have thoroughly animalized animals -as slave, body, matter, nature, and object. Indeed, humans can denigrate other humans through animalization only because animalness, though constructed, is such a stable site of meaning for us, an enduring counterpoint to humanness, the baseline below which we cannot fall. As Keith Thomas notes: "It was as a comment on human nature that the concept of 'animality' was devised" (1983, 41 Needless to say, the proposition that there is 'a baseline below which we cannot fall'
does not extend to everyone; the 'we' in this frame is persistently exclusionary (Haraway 1991; Kim 2013 Kim , 2015 Kim , 2016 Deckha 2012 Deckha , 2013 Wolfe 2010; Mbembe 2017) . It is well-known that there are humans who have been made to fall below 'the baseline'
of humanness, such as the 'Hottentoti' of Linnaeus et al.'s imaginings. The putative 'sub-species' to which Niven gestures were fabricated and then dehumanised; a process that entailed racialising species through the technology of animalisation (De Robillard & Lipschitz 2017) . Within the western ontological imagination, then, the subjects who are said to be "white" have been written out of race and animality while those who are thought to be "black" have been written into them. This is to say that "blackness" and "animality" are 'dynamically interconstituted' since ' [b] lackness is a species construct (meaning "in proximity to the animal"), and animalness is a racial construct (meaning "in proximity to the black")' (Kim 2016:17) . Owing to the animal's abject status, equating black people with what "the animal" has been made to signify discharges the stain of abjection into the fabric of blackness (Mbembe 2017; Lipschitz 2018; De Robillard & Lipschitz 2017) . Kim (2015:31) observes that 'no figure has been evoked in these speculations more often than the ape'. An animal that -although 'most human-like' -has been bestialised and is therefore not valued in the ways that are cats or dolphins, for instance (Kim 2015:31) . It is well understood that Africa has been a pivotal site for the invention and application of these ideas (Mbembe, 2017; Kim 2015 Kim , 2016 . Although, as Kim (2016:13) points out: 'It is not quite that Africans were animalized here, or had a pre-formulated apeness transferred over to them, but rather that apeness and blackness were hammered out in intimate relation in the crucible of the Western imaginary, each taking shape with the other in mind'. The modes of co-production, rather than substitution, at work are exceptionally intricate:
[T]he "human" is paradigmatically both not-animal and not-black, birthed through the simultaneous application of these two caesurae, requiring the presence of both the "animal" and the "black" to locate itself. The "human" ejects itself from the superset category of animal and ejects from within itself the subset category of black, opening a zone of thriving marked by these external and internal limits. Subtending both the human-animal dyad and the human-black dyad, therefore, is the humanblack-animal triad. (Kim 2016:15) .
By adjusting arguments that assume a dualistic relationship between race and species, Kim (2015:17) proposes that it is necessary to 'think in terms of taxonomies', rather than dualisms, since 'race is not expressed as a binary of white over black (or white over nonwhite) but as a complex, fluid set of multiple positions (Kim 1999 (Kim , 2000 '. So, for Kim (2015:17-18) , then, 'the concept of species cannot be reduced to a dualism (human/animal) but rather expresses itself as a taxonomy or complex page 10 of 26 hierarchical ordering of different animal kinds'; a taxonomy that is 'synergistic' rather than 'interlocking'. Proteus enacts how it is that 'synergistic' taxonomies of race and species were made to constellate. 'Europeanus Albus' was 'bronny' and 'gentle' and therefore "white" not only because "he" (it was always a "he') was not 'Simian', "he" was 'bronny' and 'gentle' and "white" because "he" was also not like 'Americanus Rufus' (who was 'choleric' and 'obstinate') or "black" like 'Africanus Niger' (who was 'sluggish' and 'crappy'). 'Europeanus Albus' was 'bronny' and 'gentle' and "white" because "he" was unlike 'monorchides Hottentoti' and because "he" was further away from 'Simian' being than any of Linnaeus's other 'binomials'. Furthermore, 'Americanus
Rufus' was 'content' and 'free', and further away from 'Homo monstrosus', and 'Simian'
being than was 'Africanus Niger' who was 'indolent', 'negligent' and closer to 'Homo
Monstrosus' and so on and so on.
Recalling Blank's question, where the 'Hottentot' is located matters a great deal because the category both forms and expands 'the baseline below which we cannot fall'. By marking the cut-off point between the human and the animal the category is made to set the terms, and construe the limits, of the 'we' who acquire the status of humanness. Although it was naturalised as a biological fact, Proteus illustrates that the 'monorchides Hottentoti' was a taxonomical fiction. The film presents the moment at which Blank asks this question not to establish "the answer", it does so to query the ontological precepts -and effects -of racialising taxonomical enterprises. One of the striking features of this scene is that, the "black" figure, 'Africanus Niger', is located above the 'baseline' on the side of humanness, even though, as Niven's description makes explicit, he does not share full humanity with 'Europeanus Albus'. This is not always the case. What the scene suggests is that the terms of race and species hierarchies, and the ways in which the discourse of race has both relied on and defined species meanings, have been, and are, arbitrary and mutable. There have been times and places, as Michael Lundblad's work proves, when, instead of being located above the 'baseline', 'the black "savage" was placed below the ranks of those that possessed animal instincts' (Lundblad, in Jackson 2013:678) . Investigating 'the historical emergence of the jungle as a discourse in the United States', Lundblad (2013:4) shows that this racialising discourse became especially potent once Darwinian and Freudian thinking coalesced:
In the discourse of the jungle, the behavior of "real" animals comes to represent "natural" human instincts, particularly in terms of violence and heterosexuality … the key confluence, in my view, was when Freudian psychoanalysis traveled to U.S. shores and translated Darwinist constructions of "real" animals into "animal instincts" within the human psyche … The early work of Freud crystallized these constructions of human animality. According to Lundblad (2013:5) , '[a]t the turn of the century, the discourse of the jungle was much more unsettled, complex, and inconsistent than current critical interpretations' admit. Analysing a range of influential texts, Lundblad (2013:5) charts how many evinced 'the Darwinist-Freudian jungle', while others 'resisted' its terms, and others still presented 'alternative constructions of animality', for instance, Tarzan of the Apes that 'distorted evolutionary hierarchies that place animality above blackness'. 36 Lundblad's (2013:5) larger claim is that the 'Progressive-Era' in the United States was a:
[H]istorical moment in which constructions of animality-both human and nonhuman-seem rather different from what we might expect today. Consider Topsy, for example: a circus elephant publicly electrocuted in front of a large crowd at Coney Island in 1903; should animals (and the working-class immigrants they sometimes symbolized) be punished as agents responsible for their own actions? Or, Ota Benga: an African man publicly displayed in the Monkey House of the Bronx Zoo in 1906; could animals be claimed to be closer to white men within evolutionary discourse, making "savages" somehow "lower" than animals?
Lundblad answers the latter question by examining one of the contexts in which the durable, but fluid, 'race-species order' (De Robillard & Lipschitz 2017; Kim 2015 Kim , 2016 is produced over time to reverse the positions of blackness and apeness as they were represented in the Linnaean system. When humans started to "become animal", the 'zoo-logo racial order' (Kim 2016:17) did not dispense with the beast or the savage.
Instead, "white" exceptionalism was reinscribed by a range of procedures through which blackness was made to be unassimilable, once again. Calls for the more humane treatment of animals were one of the points around which race-species differences were simultaneously reorganised and consolidated. Zakiyyah Jackson (2013:677-678) registers the 'field-transformative' potential of Lundblad's contribution to analyses of how, why, and to what ends, race and animality are made to circumscribe the terms of humanness and recounts one of his crucial insights:
At a moment when an understanding of human behavior was increasingly reliant upon a construction of an "animal" human psyche, the discourse of human animality bifurcated along racial lines … In the discourse of humane reform, white humans, especially those with class privilege, were distinctive in that they had the capacity to restrain, control, or repress their "animal instincts," unlike black people who were possessed by "savagery" and "passion." … Thus, at the moment when the conception of "the human" was reorganized such that humanity was understood as coincident with "the animal," humane discourse relying on this new understanding simultaneously reformulated blackness as inferior to both "the human" and "the animal". ISSN To Lundblad's insights, we should add Kim's (2016:20) observation that, '[t]he ontological certainty of the "human" turns out to depend upon the ontological uncertainty of "black" and "animal."' An ontological enfolding 'in which both imagined entities-"black"
and "animal"-are produced as indeterminate relative to one another' (Kim 2016:20) .
It is the very instability and indeterminacy of the ontological foundation of humanness which triggers the anxieties that propel controversies such as the one that occasioned the news about the Homo naledi fossils.
Undoing "the Human"
These finds again underline that Africa, our continent, is the home of great scientific discoveries, the home of our humanity, the home of our collective cultures as humans. These discoveries underline the fact that despite our individual differences in the way we appear, the languages that we speak, the beliefs that we hold onto, and our cultural practices, we are bound together by a common ancestry. Cyril Ramaphosa 37
Human populations appear to be different in terms of colour, body size, limb proportions, hair texture and other physical attributes. Beneath the surface, we are all virtually identical. There is no genetic boundary for race. We are one species. Maropeng Visitor Centre 38
Science is materialism -its facts that can be proven. No one will dig old monkey bones to back up a theory that I was once a baboon -sorry … It's insults like this that make some of us to question the whole thing. Zwelinzima Vavi (quoted in Germaner 2015:1)
Humanity did not evolve from the Animal Kingdom, and more specifically the apes. Mathole Motshekga (quoted in Germaner 2015:1) 39
There is nothing wrong with scientists and paleontologists investigating the origins of things … It's important to look at different fossils, creatures and skeletons. The problem comes in when we say human evolution itself, especially Africans, descended from animals. the 'Almost Human' tag, Berger et al. were eager to place the fossils in close proximity to "humans". 41 As a consequence, they unwittingly drew attention to the instability of what is taken to be the settled ontological foundation of humanness; a foundation that has, in fact, been conjured through the invention and co-production of race and animality. These effects were unintentional because the naledi research is invested in securing ontological foundations -coded here as 'origins' -albeit with the understanding that these might be more hybridised and ramified than had been thought previously. 42
Unfixing the "human" from an apparently fixed ontological substrate, throws into disorder the system of species meanings that keeps "humans" and "animals" apart and in place. It is not surprising, then, that news about the fossils provoked anxiety within the polity. Predictably, this anxiety manifested as a dispute about race-species meanings and hierarchies. The dispute was fuelled by the Cradle's role in the production of white supremacy. As I have mentioned before, the Cradle has always been implicated in the peculiar torsions of race thinking in South Africa. Bonner et al. (2007:277) confirm that the apartheid racial imagination was constituted, in part, through a 'creationist' suspicion, and re-purposing, of Darwinist theories about human evolution; it was an important site for this imaginative work:
Notions of 'racial superiority', coupled with creationism, played out as an odd mix of what can best be described as a cross between Victorian polygenism 43 and Darwin's suggestion that some 'races' were vestiges of different stages in the evolution of 'mankind' … Many white people came to believe that they had been created, but that black people had evolved, and many black people regarded activities at Sterkfontein 44 with suspicion because they understandably believed that the motive behind the excavation was to prove that the 'blacks' had evolved.
Evolution thus not only touched on religious sensitivities but cut to the core of South African identity politics.
As was the case in the Progressive Era that Lundblad investigates, we see in the history that Bonner et al. trace how a white supremacist formation reacts to the discourse of evolution by producing species differences that are made to bifurcate along racial lines. This history was both occluded -and contained -in the naledi media event. Naturally, it surfaced when the public responded to the news. frame the human evolution exhibition hall at Maropeng. The centre has been conceived as a nation-making site that contests the racist terms of South Africa's formation (Bonner et al. 2007 ). This is done through a discourse which posits that 'we are all one' and 'all African', rather than any explicit confrontation with, or deconstruction of, the racist effects of the research that had been undertaken at the Cradle in the previous century. Inasmuch as this history is addressed it is done in entirely indirect terms. 45
Through emphasising that the naledi specimens reconfirm 'our collective culture as humans', and by saying that 'we are one global species with an African heritage', Ramaphosa and Maropeng implicitly want to give the lie to racist taxonomies, which earlier research conducted at the Cradle had helped to fabricate. These discursive and symbolic interventions sought to undo and re-make species meanings by alluding to contemporary scientific research that unsettles the grounds on which palaeoscience had contrived racial differences. To give another example of this re(de)-construction of race-thinking, in its 'special issue' on race, National Geographic published an article titled 'Skin Deep' in which the author, Elizabeth Kolbert, surveyed developments in the fields of genetics and evolutionary theory. 46 Kolbert (2018:28-30) introduced her discussion in the following way: 'What is race exactly? Science tells us there is no genetic or scientific basis for it. Instead it's largely a made-up label, used to define and separate us.' To illustrate its claims about human and animal genetic propinquity, the article includes an illustration which places a photograph of a "white" infant alongside one of a chimpanzee. Since this image featured in the 'special issue' about race in which the publication set out to undo the racist visual system it helped to engender, it would not be unreasonable to assume that National Geographic structured the image in this way because it appreciated just how incendiary it would be to juxtapose photographs of chimpanzees and "black" infants.
Racist comments and memes started to circulate on Twitter in the hours and days after the media briefing. To exemplify the genre, it will suffice to make reference to two tweets each of which drew comparisons between the naledi fossils and Naledi
Pandor who was serving as a cabinet minister in the ANC-led government at the time. 47 MrGift@NiceNic72407352 posted an image that positioned a photograph of Homo naledi alongside a tightly cropped photograph of Naledi Pandor's face. The image was captioned as follows: 'Homo Naledi vs Naledi Pandor'. This meme relies for its racist effects on widely known bestialising stereotypes; the imputation, of course, being that Naledi Pandor is everything that "the animal" has come to represent. are read as further evidence of the facticity of typological racial differences. This anxious misreading attempts to make the fossils consolidate precisely what it is that they unsettle, namely, the racial bifurcation of "human" and "animal" genetic material.
Homo naledi's 'schizoid' (Shreeve 2015:43) anatomical 'pattern', the co-presence of so-called "human" and "animal" features, undoes the idea that whiteness is uncontaminated by animality and that blackness is somehow coterminous with it. As Noah Yuval Harari's comment included as an epigraph shows, refutations of the aforesaid are entering into popular consciousness. 49 Those who are cathected to racist logics cannot come to terms with these race-unmaking processes. The racist memes they circulate are frantic attempts to repress what is that they are being made to know. To be sure, what this drive to reinscribe racial typologies and hierarchies ends up revealing is that it can never be done 'in any permanently successful way' (Kim 2015:25) .
I now want to bring into focus statements that were made by a number of prominent black South Africans each of whom repudiated any connection between blackness and animality. Zwelinzima Vavi, the influential trade unionist, said that he was 'no grandchild of any ape, monkey, or baboon' and that 'no one will dig old monkey bones to back up a theory that I was once a baboon … It's insults like this that make some of us to question the whole thing' (in Berger entered into what the media staged as a 'race row' 55 in the following terms:
The discovery of Homo naledi should not be seen as a way for people to put religion under the microscope, but rather a way to better understand humanity's deep family tree. … Our science is not asking questions of religion nor challenging anyone's belief systems; it is simply exploring the fossil evidence for the origin of our species. I would repeat: we, as a species, are not descendant from baboons; baboons are a distant relative of ours no closer in their relationship to us most likely than a dog is related to a cat. Naledi is a human relative, giving us insight into our deep family tree. We completely agree that humans are not descended from baboons. The search for human origins is one that celebrates all of humankind's common origins on the continent of Africa. It should not be divisive (in Germaner 2015:1).
Berger's rebuttal was couched in the same 'we are one' and 'all African' discourse that shaped Ramaphosa's speech and to which Maropeng hews. While he referred to the objections that were rooted in religious formulations, Berger did not make any explicit reference to those that had to do with racism. Indeed, race is not mentioned.
Instead, the question of racism and how it has been at stake in palaeoscience in general, and the Cradle in particular, is elided by his insistence that: 'it [the fossils]
should not be divisive'. In effect, Berger's intervention was designed to defuse the controversy by avoiding the history of racism in both the field and the site within which he works. 56 The other, related, question that Berger's comments circumvent is that of "the animal". In saying that 'humans are not descended from baboons' and that 'baboons are a distant relative of ours', he was attempting to deflect the concerns that Vavi's remarks represented by placing humans and animals at a great distance from one another.
Berger was trying to thread a rather fine needle here since, as he had argued at the initial media briefing, the naledi specimens demonstrate an especially striking entanglement of apparently "human" and "animal" features. Now, while it is possible to imagine why a palaeoscientist conducting research at the Cradle would not want to delve into the site's involvement with the production of white supremacist logics, it nonetheless was inadequate to respond to the taxonomical panic that the news page 17 of 26 
Conclusion
Disputes such as the one described in this article are, as Kim (2010:70) says, 'site [s] for the production, contestation, and reproduction of racial, cultural and species difference', which 'reveal a great deal about the influence that interlocking dualisms continue to have in delineating who matters morally in … society and why'. Although
Berger and Ramaphosa had a point when they highlighted that the boundaries of "the human" were at stake in the naledi fossil research, the framework that was used to account for the specimens's significance was vexed by the failure to attend to the 'interconstitution' of race and species. Put differently, the Homo naledi controversy demonstrates the perils of eliding the history of race science. It also manifests the difficulty of retaining within an anti-racist perspective "the animal" as a category to secure "the human" (De Robillard & Lipschitz 2017) . Instead, what is needed is an anti-racist frame that adopts a post-anthropocentric orientation to unravel the 'zoologo racial order' (Kim 2016:17) ; an order that has always sought to render the "human" through the coproduction of blackness and animality. This would entail undoing "the animal", which, Felice Cimatti observes, 'is an invention, the sum of what we do not recognize as human' (Cimatti, in Salzani 2016:108) . It would also require unmaking racist species meanings and taxonomical hierarchies by proceeding with the understanding that -as the naledi fossils themselves suggest -the ontological oppositions through which nature has been materialised and explained to us can be especially unsound. As Proteus illustrates, western ontological frames that have to do with race and animality were produced through arbitrary and fallacious postulates. Jackson (2013:679) insists that the work of dislodging and reimagining these postulates is vital because '[b]iopolitics is enacted through the arbitrary coding and recoding of [these] rubrics and the referents' they purport 'to index'. The co-presence within the naledi materials of so-called "human" and "animal" features highlights just how unstable and unbounded these ontological oppositions can be (Chen 2012) . They also reveal that the space between "human" and "animal" is indeterminate and always on the point of disintegrating (Kim 2015) . Since, as we have seen, meaning is inscribed on the bones, rather than simply "discovered" in them, it seems to me that rather than only fuelling a search for "origins", the naledi fossils demand a careful evaluation of how they relate to the production of race-species taxonomies and the ontological imaginaries these instantiate. ISSN 9. Berger (2017) has said that he worked with a team of up to sixty researchers on the naledi project.
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